Starting October 1, Ukrzaliznytsia plans to effectively block private rolling stock from accessing its 1,435 mm gauge bogies. UZ intends to use its entire available fleet of these bogies exclusively under its own wagons, while selling transportation rights through Prozorro.Sale auctions. Such auctions have already been announced, including for grain wagons operating on the route via Vadul-Siret to Romania.
For the agricultural sector, the situation is particularly concerning, as a significant share of grain wagons belongs to private companies that have invested their own funds in rolling stock. UCAB has openly called the proposed mechanism unacceptable and warns that it could result in grain shipment delays, higher logistics costs, and lower exports. At the same time, western border crossings are currently operating at only around one-third of their capacity, handling approximately 300,000 tonnes of grain per month against a potential capacity of more than 1 million tonnes.
The situation is further aggravated by the fact that Ukraine’s railway infrastructure effectively has no competitive alternative. This is not merely an assessment by the business community: the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine has officially established Ukrzaliznytsia’s monopolistic (dominant) position, with a 100% market share in access to railway infrastructure, mainline locomotive traction, and rail freight transportation. The AMCU has also previously identified cases in which UZ used its market power to impose conditions on customers regarding the use of its own wagons.
All of this is happening against the backdrop of continuously rising rail logistics costs. According to UCAB estimates, the latest tariff increase added approximately $5–7 per tonne to the cost of transporting grain, while logistics costs toward Romanian ports have risen by around $60 per tonne overall. Businesses stress that instead of utilizing available capacity and bringing freight back to the railway, new restrictions could push shippers even further away from rail transport.
The problem has already extended far beyond the agricultural sector. In July, the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Economic Development called for a review of UZ’s freight tariff increases. Earlier, calculations by Ukrpromzovnishekspertyza presented during parliamentary hearings estimated that a 37% tariff increase could cost the economy around UAH 100 billion in GDP, UAH 98 billion in foreign currency revenues, and more than UAH 36 billion in budget revenues. These are modelled estimates of the potential consequences of a specific tariff scenario, rather than losses that have already occurred.
Even the relevant ministry acknowledges the systemic nature of the problem: in 2026, a Deputy Minister for Communities and Territories Development stated that the closed-monopoly model with cross-subsidization is losing its effectiveness. At the same time, Ukrzaliznytsia’s position is that freight tariffs generate around 80% of the company’s revenue, while its financial position remains difficult: in the first four months of 2026, the company recorded a net loss of UAH 9.3 billion.
Ultimately, the business community is raising questions that go far beyond the issue of 1,435 mm bogies. The core issue is whether a state-owned infrastructure monopolist should be able to restrict private rolling stock from accessing a critical resource while simultaneously selling an equivalent transportation option using its own wagons. At a time when maritime logistics remain unstable and the country needs exports and foreign currency revenues, UCAB is calling for the restrictions to be lifted, cross-subsidization to be discontinued, and transparent cost-based tariff setting to be introduced.